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Abstract:  
According to the established case-law of the European Court of Human Rights, the Contracting Parties the 
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms have the obligation to provide an 
effective remedy to the person that pretends that his right to a fair trial has been violated. Such a remedy must 
include  a  compensatory  component;  the  European  Court,  in  its  judgments  relating  to  Italian  Pinto  Law, 
underlined the essential character of the compensation in cases of excessive length of proceedings; still, the 
same Court encouraged States Parties not only to compensate, but also to offer an acceleratory remedy, in order 
to reduce the length of the procedures, as well as the amount of the compensation once the proceedings have 
been finalized. Following several major judgments pronounced by the European Court, some European States 
reacted by implementing such remedies: most  solutions combine elements of acceleration  with elements  of 
compensation. The experience of such countries allows the institutionalization of a form of remedy that could be 
implemented also in Romania where, although there are some legal provisions stipulating some form of redress, 
we cannot talk of an authentic effective remedy. The present paper will focus on the acceleratory remedy, seen 
not only as a demarche at the disposal of the individual, but also as an interesting measure allowing for the 
reduction of length of procedures and thus limiting the effect of a violation of the right to a fair trial. 
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Introduction
In 2001, overwhelmed by the number of cases enrolled on the docket of the European Court 
of  Human  Rights  (herein  the  Court),  alleging  the  violation  of  the  right  to  a  fair  trial  within  a 
reasonable time, recognized in article 6 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms (herein the Convention), Italy adopted the famous now Pinto Law. The piece 
of legislation was intended to offer to those complaining about the length of the judicial proceedings 
a domestic remedy allowing for compensation, thus reducing the number of complaints before the 
Court and alleviating its docket. The redress was welcomed by the European jurisdiction, which 
underlined the importance of a national compensatory recourse. Still, five years later, in a series of 
Great Chamber judgments on the question of the effective character of the Pinto remedy in cases of 
unreasonable length of judicial proceedings, although the Court maintained the important nature of a 
compensatory  redress,  it  underlined  the  essential  need  for  prevention  and  remarked:  ”The  best 
solution in absolute terms is indisputably, as in many spheres, prevention. (…) Where the judicial 
system is deficient in this respect, a remedy designed to expedite the proceedings in order to 
prevent them from becoming excessively lengthy is the most effective solution. Such a remedy 
offers an undeniable advantage over a remedy affording only compensation since it also prevents a 
finding of successive violations in respect of the same set of proceedings and does not merely repair 
the breach a posteriori, as does a compensatory remedy of the type provided for under Italian law, 
for example.”
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This remark of the European Court on one hand encouraged the efforts already made by some 
States like Poland and Slovenia towards the implementation of a preventive domestic remedy but 
also draw other States attention (including Italy) on the fact that a compensatory redress was not 
going to be sufficient in the future in order to fight the excessive length of judicial procedures.  
Although  the  subject  was  present  in  the  preoccupation  of  the  European  Court  from  the 
beginning  of  the  2000,  and  Romania  started  in  2003  to  see  the  judicial  procedures  before  the 
domestic courts challenged before the international jurisdiction in term of unreasonable length, it was 
only in 2009, with the release of the Abramiuc judgment
2, that the need for a national remedy at the 
disposal of those  alleging the violation of the right to a fair  trial within a reasonable time was 
expressly affirmed by the European Court.  
Still, two years later, such a remedy is not yet in place and the law on the Small Reform does 
not introduce such a redress at the disposal of individuals and entities discontented with the duration 
of the judicial proceedings they were involved in.
In the search of a pattern for such a remedy, which is necessary and will be requested in the 
case-law of the European Court against Romania, we will research the past experiences of other 
countries; their reaction to the excessive length of judicial procedures in term of prevention will be 
studied only as it refers to domestic remedies. Although the systemic reforms are the best solutions, 
from  the  European  Court   perspective,  only  national  recourses  can  be  evaluated  in  terms  of 
exhaustion of domestic remedies.  
Given the technical nature of the subject, our references will mainly consist of the case-law of 
the Court. It serves both to identify the problem and to evaluate the solutions found by different 
States.
The  goal  of  this  research  is  to  sketch  a  possible  acceleratory  remedy  that  could  be 
implemented in Romanian legal order, to combat, from the individual perspective, the unreasonable 
length of judicial procedures.  
Past experiences: lessons learned? 
Several States were confronted with the need to implement a domestic acceleratory remedy in 
order  to  avoid  future  complaints  before  the  European  Court  challenging  the  length  of  national 
judicial procedures. The paper will only focus on five such experiences, as some countries like Italy 
still appreciate  the compensatory redress as being not only effective but also sufficient  to  fight 
unreasonable  duration.  The  presentation  of  States   legislation  will  limit  itself  to  acceleratory 
remedies or elements. It is to be noted that all five countries accompany the acceleratory remedy with 
the compensatory one. 
The  judgment  that  marked  the  begging  of  Polish  quests  for  such  a  remedy  is  the  one 
pronounced in Kudla case
3. This case, concerning among other alleged violation the length of a 
criminal procedure already in place for 9 years at the moment the Court examined the complaint, 
offered the European jurisdiction the perfect occasion to draw States attention on their obligation to 
create in their respective national legal systems a remedy designed for hypothesis of excessive length 
of procedures.  
The  reaction  of  Poland,  although  delayed  some  four  years,  consisted  in  the  adoption  of 
legislation creating such a remedy; any party in a judicial procedure (including the enforcement ones 
or the preparatory criminal proceedings) unsatisfied with the speed of settlement of the affair was 
entitled to file a complaint, seeking ascertainment of the fact that the proceedings were pending 
longer than needed to establish the facts and resolve the case. The complaint was lodged before the 
superior court of the tribunal examining the main proceedings and was examined in the light of the 
Court’s case-law.  
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The proceedings examining such a complaint were considered as incidental ones and the 
superior court hade to deliver its evaluation in two month from the date of lodging the complaint. As 
to the outcome of the proceeding, in the situation were the conclusion was affirmative and the 
reasonable time was exceeded, the superior court may give recommendations to the court conducting 
the main proceedings on appropriate measures to be carried out in a fixed time-limit. Accompanying 
such recommendations, the national tribunal could grant satisfaction to the author of the complaint. 
The allowance of such a partial compensation did not deprive the interested party of his or her right 
to seek further compensation after the closing of the main proceedings.  
In its case-law after the adoption of this remedy, the European Court expressed its confidence 
in the potential of the redress; Charzynski
4 and Figiel
5 judgments applauded the demarche of Polish 
authorities, although some aspects relating to the actual implementation of the legislation did not 
permit the access of all interested individuals and entities to the new remedy or offers only limited 
satisfaction.  
The Czech Republic was first confronted with a conclusion regarding the inexistence of a 
remedy to allow the allegation of a violation of the right to a fair trial within a reasonable time to be 
examined before the domestic courts in Hartman
6 case. The European Court in that case examined 
two potential acceleratory remedies against the excessive length of judicial proceeding put forward 
by the Czech Government: the first one indicated was a hierarchical recourse lodged before the 
superior  court  to  the  one  conducting  the  main  proceedings.  It  was  rejected  by  the  European 
jurisdiction as it did not recognize an individual right to seek and obtain the cooperation of state 
organs  in  the  enforcement  of  the  conclusion,  but  a  mere right  to be  informed  on  the  potential 
conclusions and recommendations made to the national tribunal. The second remedy invoked by the 
Government concerned a complaint before the Constitutional Court, which could indicate to the 
national judicial organ the measures to be adopted in order to stop the violation of the right to a fair 
trial. Still, the European Court found itself unsatisfied by the fact that the recommendations of the 
Constitutional jurisdiction could not be enforced if ignored by the national tribunal and by the fact 
that no compensation was granted to the interested party.  
In reaction to the Hartman judgment, the Czech Republic reformed its legislation in order to 
introduce an acceleratory remedy, consisting in a complaint to be lodged before the president of the 
court examining the main proceedings. The president has one month to decide on the merits of the 
complaint; if the complaint is well-founded, he or she will indicate some measures to be carried out 
by the court. Still, the president could not decide on the re-allocation of the file, fix strict time limit 
for  the  court  to  complete  procedural  acts  or  put  the  file  on  the  docket  of  priorities.  Thus,  the 
European Court refused to consider this remedy more than an extension of the hierarchical remedy 
already considered inadequate and in a later decision in Vokurka
7 case the Court suggested that the 
examination  of the  complaint  be made by  the superior court  to the court involved  in  the  main 
proceedings. Despite such a recommendation, the amendments brought in 2009 to the law on the 
judicial system transfers to the very instance dealing with the main proceedings the competence to 
examine the complaint.  
Croatia developed the most rich and adaptable acceleratory remedy; after the first judgment 
on  the  infringement  of  the  reasonable  length  of judicial  proceedings
8,  The  Constitutional  Court 
reacted and through case-law and reform in legislation, developed an acceleratory remedy offer the 
constitutional jurisdiction the competence to determine a time-limit within which the competent court 
shall decide the case on the merits. Still, the growing number of constitutional complaints attracted 
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delays in theirs examination, jeopardizing the reasonable time for the decision in a certain case and, 
more  worrying,  some  decision  of  the  Constitutional  Court  were  not  respected  by  the  national 
tribunal, raising questions on the enforcement of constitutional decisions.  
The latest reform adopted by the Croatian authorities introduced essential changes in the 
competence of the Constitutional Court; from that point forward, the complaints about the length of 
judicial proceedings would be examined by the superior court of the tribunal conducting the main 
proceedings.  The  justification  of  the  reform  underlined  the  need  to  respect  the  urgency  of  the 
procedure. The court thus requested can indicate a time-limit for the adoption of a decision on the 
merits, the procedure is very speedy. The decision on the incidental complaint can be appeal only by 
the party, but not by the Attorney’s office.  
After  the  Lukenda
9  judgment,  Slovenian  authorities adopted  at  their  turn  a  legislation  to 
address the question of effective acceleratory remedies. The Act on the Protection of the right to a 
trial without undue delay of 2006 opens  for the interested party two possibilities of action: the 
supervisory appeal before the president of the court examining the case and the motion to set a 
deadline.
The supervisory appeal allows the president of the court, after requesting a report from the 
judge of the case, to indicate a time-limit not exceeding six month for the performance of certain 
procedural acts, to put the case on the priority list or to reallocate the file.  
The motion to set a deadline can only be lodged after the exhaustion of the supervisory 
appeal, before the president of the court competent to exercise appellate jurisdiction over the court 
conducting the main proceedings. The president of the appellate court can also set a deadline or 
decide to put the case of the priority list.  
The  new  legislation  has  already  been  examined  by  the  European  Court  in  its  Grzincic
judgment of 3 May 2007. The Court favorably noted the celerity of the incidental proceedings and 
the measures at the disposal of the judicial authority in cases of undue delay.  
He last experience that it is worth mentioning is the Slovakian one; after a total vide in 
legislation  concerning  a  domestic  remedy  against  unreasonable  length  of  judicial  proceedings, 
noticed by the European Court in its Havala decision of 13 September 2001, amendments were 
brought to the Constitution and the Law on Constitutional Court, to introduce the possibility of 
lodging constitutional complaints against the alleged violation of the right to a fair trial without 
undue delay. The Constitutional court, in well-founded cases, would order the court conducting the 
main proceedings to speed up the examination of the case or to perform specific procedural acts. The 
Constitutional jurisdiction could also offer satisfaction for the violation of the reasonable length 
requirement. The new amendments were already  in 2002 evaluated by the European Court that 
expressed satisfaction for their adoption and appreciated their effective character
10.
The possible model of an acceleratory remedy 
After  reviewing  the  experiences  of  countries  challenged  with  the  need  to  identify  and 
implement a remedy for cases of excessive length of judicial proceedings, certain conclusions can be 
drawn.
The  first  that  comes  to  mind,  in  light  of  Court’s  case-law,  refers  to  the  fact  that  any 
acceleratory remedy must be accompanied by a compensatory one. It is the legislator’ choice were in 
the economy of the remedial complex it places the compensation element – a partial one going hand 
in hand with the acceleratory procedure or a final compensatory redress after the closure of judicial 
proceedings  –  but  it  must  exist  to  complete  and  provide  full  effectiveness  to  the  acceleratory 
elements. This conclusion is logical if we take into account the fact that the mere recognition of the 
9 Lukenda v. Slovenia, judgment of 6 October 2005. 
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violation of the right to a fair trial, not followed by just satisfaction, does not lift the victim status to 
the individual or the entity affected by the unreasonable length of proceedings.  
This paper only follows the characteristics and benefits of the acceleratory remedy, but does 
not loose sight of the whole economy of the right to  an effective  remedy, that  the Convention 
proclaims in article 13 and that requests both recognition of the violation but also granting of just 
satisfaction.  
The first limitation of the acceleratory remedy is given by its scope: it can only be used if a 
procedure is still pending. Once the main proceedings are closed, only a compensatory request could 
be lodged. However, in order for the remedy to be in line with the conclusions already stated by the 
European Court, it should be applicable to all stages of proceedings, including the administrative 
preliminary stage or the criminal investigations, as well as the enforcement stage of a civil procedure.  
If the scope is large, the sphere of beneficiaries should be constructed in a manner to allow for 
a full protection of the right to a fair trial without invoking the acceleratory remedy against the 
individual or the entity whose right is affected. The Croatian provision forbidding the attorney to use 
the complaint for undue delay was the consequence of such a practice, where the attorney challenged 
all the decisions concluded on the violation of the right to a fair trial.  
As far the competent court or authority are concerned, the possible solutions adopted by 
different States do not suggest a certain pattern; it is true that most of the practices seem to support 
the complaint lodged before the hierarchically superior court (or its president) the most important 
issue is the functional one: if the president of the main court can adopt effective measures, e.g. 
reassignment of files, placement on the list of priorities, mandatory time-limit, then the choice of 
such a incidental procedure is favorably appreciated by the European Court.  
Still,  within  the  domestic  system,  accurate  attention  must  be  paid  to  situations  were  the 
measures  adopted  in  the  framework  of  the  acceleratory  remedy  are  misused;  for  example,  the 
reallocation of files is a measures that theoretically is beneficial to the interested party, but can also 
be  a way for  over-loaded  judges  to  see  their  docket  alleviating.  Another  problem  could be  the 
inadequate balance between the boldness of measures that could be indicated and the enforcement 
options or the inexistence of alternatives in case the main court is ignoring or unable to perform the 
procedural acts or to reach a solution on the merits in the fixed time-limit. In this light, the solution 
put forward by the Slovenian legislator seems to be the most balanced, although in other cases, like 
Slovakian one, the fact that the decision of the Constitutional Court are followed by the main court is 
also a positive sign.  
To  complete  the  functional  criterion,  the  above  exposed  experience  indicated  that  this 
procedure should imply with necessity, at least at a later stage, the access to a judicial form of 
control; the complaint before the president of the main court, although effective, in order to be more 
than an hierarchical supervision, must be doubled by the possibility to present a complaint to the 
appellate court (or at least its president).  
Irrespective  of  the  choice  made  as  to  the  competent  court  or  authority,  the  incidental 
procedure must be a speedy one, offering an evaluation and a decision in a maximum four month. 
The evaluation should always follow the Court’s case-law, the criteria the Court developed regarding 
the behavior of the individual or entity invoking the violation of the right, the behavior of competent 
authorities, the complexity of the case, the moment in the procedure when the complaint is being 
lodged.  
Where does Romanian domestic legal order stand? 
As stated in the introductory section, in 2009 Romania faced the need to introduce in the 
domestic legal order an effective remedy in cases of alleged violation of a right to a fair trial within a 
reasonable time. Still, two years from the Abramiuc judgment, the only legislative remedy existing is 
to be found in the new Code of Civil Procedure, that was adopted in 2010 and is still to enter into 
force.828  Challenges of the Knowledge Society. Law
The acceleratory remedy can be lodged by any party to the main proceedings, including the 
prosecutor participating in the case, with the goal of requesting a decision on measures to be taken in 
order to eliminate such a situation of disrespect for the right to a fair trial, but only they consider to 
find  themselves  in  one  of  the  following  situations:  the  time-limit  stipulated  by  law  for  the 
performance of a certain procedural act, for the  delivery  of a  judgment or of its considerations 
elapsed without the compliance to the legal requirement; the court has indicated a time-limit for a 
participant in the main proceedings to perform a procedural act, to present a document or certain 
information and the indication was ignored, but still the court did not adopted the measures provided 
by law, or when the court disregarded its obligation to solve the case in a predictable optimal time-
limit.  
According to the new legislation, the complaint will be examined and decided upon within 5 
days, by the judges conducting the main proceedings. If they consider the complaint to be well-
founded, the court will immediately take all the necessary measures to eliminate the situation that 
cause the undue delay and notify the measures adopted to the author of the complaint. The decision 
admitting the complaint can not be appealed; the decision rejecting the complaint can be appealed in 
3 days from the notification. The decision on the appeal must be taken within 10 days from the 
receipt of the file. In case of well-founded appeal, the court will decide on the measures to be taken 
by the main court and, when appropriate, it will also fix a time-limit for the performance of the 
procedural acts or legal measures. The whole procedure is taking place without notification of the 
parties.  
Some preliminary remarks on this acceleratory remedy, in the light of the abovementioned 
experiences of several States, as evaluated by the European Court, will cast more shadows than light 
on it.  
We  should  begin  by  mentioning  that  the  provisions  are  part  of  the  Civil  Code  thus 
inapplicable  to  criminal  proceedings.  Or,  an  effective  remedy  must  also  be  offered  for  those 
complaining about the length of this kind of proceedings.
As far as the substance of the mechanism is concerned, we deplore the fact that the same court 
conducting the main proceedings, in fact the same judges, will examine the acceleratory complaint. 
As justice must not only be done, but must be seen to be done, this element will affect the perception 
on the impartiality of the decision. It is a good point the fact that an appeal is provided in case the 
complaint is rejected. Still, an acceleratory remedy before the appellate court, without an appeal of 
the decision would have offered a more impartial appearance of the mechanism. But, even when the 
same judges reach the conclusion of an undue delay, they will indicate themselves the measures to be 
taken. Or, given the active role of the judge, it would seem to us that they already are aware of the 
measures to be adopted in order to assure a reasonable length of proceedings. 
The third remark is targeting the grounds for lodging such a complaint: in great part, the 
disrespect of legal and judicial deadlines. The criteria enshrined in the case-law of the Court would 
become  useless  and  still  with  the  respect  of  all  legal  and  judicial  time-limits  sometimes  the 
proceedings  are  excessively  long,  as  the  provisions  are  permissive  or  the  disrespect  is  not 
accompanied by sanctions. 
Another remark concerns the absence of any compensatory element; furthermore, penalties 
are  provided  in  case  of  abuse  of  the  right  to  complaint.  Taking  into  account  the  fact  that  the 
examination of the complaint does not have a suspensive effect and the short time –limit for the 
adoption of a decision, the sanctions imposed have a discouraging effect on the interested party.  
Conclusions  
The  acceleratory  remedy,  as  part  of  the  effective  remedy  stipulated  in  article  13  of  the 
Convention,  is  essential  as  it  offers  the  possibility  to  reduce  the  already  length  of  a  judicial 
proceeding. It is also a fact that its preventive role is limited: in fact, it can and should be used an 829
instrument to evaluate on a regular basis the length of a given proceeding, in order not to extend the 
reasonable requirement. Still, its regulation and its functioning suggest that it intervenes at a stage 
where already there are some signs of undue delay. In this hypothesis, it is too late to prevent the 
excessive length, but still it can play a useful role in limiting its unreasonable character.  
If we were to create a sketch of a theoretical acceleratory remedy, we would support an 
acceleratory remedy that be lodged before the appellate court (for cases of criminal investigation, the 
court  competent  to  deliver  the  judgment  on  the  merits  in  first  instance  or  the  court  in  which 
jurisdiction the enforcement procedure is taking place). The court should, in well-founded cases, fix a 
certain time-limit or decide to place the case on the priority list. It is true that a possible measure is 
thus being left aside: the reassignment of the case. Still, we expressed already certain doubts on the 
implications of such a measure and we consider that the gain of the involvement of the superior or 
appellate court is more consistent then the loss brought to the picture by the renunciation to this 
measure.  In  our  view,  the  involvement  of  the  appellate  court  would  eliminate  the  perception, 
although unsubstantiated, that the main court is judge in its own case.  
It is in the advantage of celerity that the procedure be a non-contentious and mainly written 
one; some measures preliminary to the examination of the case could be useful, such as the request of 
a report from the judge of the case, the request of the file or of a copy of the file, the notification to 
the other parties to the main proceedings on the lodging of an acceleratory complaint.  
A deadline must be set for the adoption of the decision in the incidental proceedings, and this 
deadline  should  not  exceed  four  month.  In  the  evaluation  of  the  well-founded  character  of  the 
complaint, the criteria already enshrined in the case-law of the European Court should serve as 
guidance  to  the  instance:  the  whole  length  of  the  proceedings,  the  time  elapsed  since  the  past 
acceleratory complaint, the complexity of the case, the nature of the case requesting special diligence 
from the part of the authorities, the behaviour of the interested party as well as the behaviour of the 
authorities and also the repercussions of the case on the personal situation of the interested party.  
In  case  where  the  well-founded  character  of  the  complaint  is  established,  the  measures 
directed to accelerate the procedures could imply, inter alia: fixing a time-limit for the performance 
of certain procedural acts, placing the case on the priority list, eventually the reallocation of the case 
to a different court or taking over the case by the appellate court. Although possible in theory, the last 
measure is not very recommendable, as it deprived the individual or the entity of an appeal. In any 
event, the appellate court will not offer any indication on the factual elements of the case nor suggest 
any solution to be endorsed by the main court.  
Once the length of the proceedings evaluated as excessive, the main court should benefit of a 
limited time to perform required procedural acts and to deliver a decision on the merits. For this 
reason, a new acceleratory complaint should only be admissible after a certain period; a six to twelve 
month term is in our view a reasonable and allows for the proper decision to be adopted in the main 
proceedings. The actual prohibition limit should be established by the appellate court, after due 
consideration of elements like the whole length of the proceedings, the stage of the proceedings in 
the moment of the evaluation and the realistic chances of a solution.  
For  the  sake  of  celerity,  the  points  of  a  possible  appeal  to  a  decision  in  acceleratory 
proceedings  should  be  strictly  listed  by  the  legislation.  This  would  avoid  a  ¨process  about  the 
process¨; moreover, the appeal in the acceleratory proceedings, given the other elements, would not 
justify on the grounds of guaranteeing impartiality.  
In our view, this is the model that should be followed by the Romanian authorities. The 
specific provisions concerning the partial of final compensation, the source of this compensation are 
the legislator’s choice. Still, the Romanian legislator needs to make a choice, in order to provide the 
effective remedy and avoid complaints before the European Court. Complaints that, in the end, will 
only lead to the same requirement: the creation in the domestic legal order of an effective remedy, 
combining elements of acceleratory and compensatory nature.   830  Challenges of the Knowledge Society. Law
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